I was recently delighted to come across the works of
Professor Philip Kitcher
of Columbia University, one of whose books I cited in [1]. An acclaimed philosopher, he blessedly
doesn't seem to have a metaphysical bone in his body—unlike those whose
philosophy-cum-metaphysics I have decried [2,3]. I was therefore inspired to read
another of his books, Science
in a Democratic Society.
The book argues that science only very imperfectly conforms
itself to the role it should play in a democracy, a failing that has resulted
in increasing popular suspicion of its results. It notes that respect for science in the U.S. has fallen far
from that in its post-World War II heyday, during which era it was much
influenced by Vannevar Bush's famous report to President Roosevelt, Science, the Endless
Frontier. Kitcher thinks a newer prospectus for science is
essential for our era.
Kitcher points to a harsh indicator of the falling esteem
for science and scientists: The
new sciences of molecular biology, genetic modification of organisms (GMO), and
global warming have been received with mistrust, anger and denial by
substantial numbers. He
maintains that the shift is partially because science has not properly included
itself as much within the conventions of democratic consensus as is currently
expected of it. Scientists remain
too much removed from most of the citizenry, sometimes seeming to set
themselves up as godheads looking down on the values and wisdom of the folk. Society is culpable too, for it does
not adequately educate all its members about the results, methods and
limitations of science. Kitcher
therefore addresses his book to a proposal for returning science to a
more-accepted position.
In a perfect democracy, Kitcher writes, each adult would be
fully informed and have equal weight in decision making. While that may be possible in a
democracy with only dozens of people, it of course isn't in one with
millions. Large societies have
therefore organized "divisions of epistemic labor":
"Consider
the entire range of questions pertinent to public life, all matters about what
the society should aspire to and how it might realize whatever aims are
set. These topics are partitioned,
divided into nonoverlapping sets, and for each set in the partition except one,
a particular group of people is designated as authoritative with respect to
that set. For the remaining set,
epistemic equality holds: that is, on these topics each citizen is entitled to
make up his/her own mind. …
"[W]hat
ideals to adopt, or what goals to pursue … should be assigned to that set of
topics on which citizens should make up their own minds. Moreover some questions about facts
might also belong in this set, issues about which each of us can be expected to
be competent, or even privileged."
I'll denote as "Set A"
the topics Kitcher says should reside in the domain of the public at large.
Kitcher asserts that increasing public wariness of science
boils down to this: Many have
concluded that scientists have arrogated to themselves decisions on set-A
topics that should be reserved for the body politic as a whole. In molecular biology, particularly the
use of embryonic stem cells and cloning, they believe that scientists have
pre-empted fundamental decisions on the value of life, which belong to set
A. The same applies to the
contentious issue of GMOs and the fear many have about polluting the
environment, another set-A topic.
The perception of science thus "running amok" spills over to
the most important issue of all, global warming, where the populace should
clearly listen to the experts, but many don't because of accumulated doubts
about scientists' integrity and objectivity. I myself suspect that this increased mistrust has magnified
anti-evolution and creationist fervor beyond its levels a half century ago.
To cope with this erosion of trust, Kitcher proposes a way
to align science better with democratically derived values. He calls it "well-ordered science,"
a paradigm in which "specification of the problems to be pursued would be
endorsed by an ideal conversation, embodying all human points of view, under
conditions of mutual engagement."
Such a conversation would be conducted more in the spirit of a town-hall
meeting than through today's hierarchical political mechanism. It is a utopian concept, but one with
valuable insight into the necessary interaction of science and the public in a
democracy. Kitcher clearly has a Jeffersonian faith that truth will out in reasoned discourse among well-informed people.
In even imagining the suggested "ideal
conversation," a clear tension arises between two conflicting concepts of
science: an autonomous effort, largely unconstrained, for discovering
fundamental principles of nature (mostly a position of scientists); and a means
for solving practical problems, restrained within the context of societal
values (mostly a concern of the laity).
Kitcher submits that the tension must be resolved by fully enlightened,
give-and-take dialogs equally involving experts who represent the viewpoint of
science in the abstract and laypersons who represent the values and needs of
society as a whole.
The book devotes hundreds of pages to elaboration of
"well-ordered science."
There is no way to do justice to this difficult discussion in a short
essay, but a brief summary of stages of Kitcher's ideal conversation is
illuminating:
• Assessment of Options. Scientists lay out the significance of
possible courses science might take, indicating which have intrinsic interest
("pure science") and which have more immediate practical potential
("applied science"). The
object is to bring all discussants to a tutored state on science and to try to
come to agreement, based on societal values, on options worth pursuing for the
good of both abstract science and society at large.
• Certification of Results. As the debate on global
warming illustrates, a coterie of scientists cannot alone persuasively certify
the results of science when faced with untutored denial and claims of fraud and
misrepresentation. Instead,
certification must involve participation by informed, disinterested and trusted
laypersons whose imprimatur will lend credence to results, which scientists by
themselves cannot. Standards of
certification must be high and transparent, acceptable to all.
• Application of Results. Even if scientific results are
certified as true, it is not clear that a resource-limited and
value-constrained society would want to take action on them, and if so, for
whose benefit. What are the
benefits of building another particle accelerator compared to those of
conquering cancer? Should GMOs
be further deployed, and if so how should their benefits and disbenefits enter
the assessment? How should global
warming be addressed, taking account of both present needs and future
menaces?
To many, Kitcher's scheme may appear too well-ordered—frighteningly regimented and even
Big-Brotherish—undermining the classical conception of science as free-wheeling
and independent in pursuing nature's truths without substantial
interference. Others will assert
that there can be no agreement in the ideal conversation about the values held
in set A, hence no decisions on courses of action laden with these values. Kitcher takes pains and many
pages to assuage such fears, arguing not only that they are exaggerated but
that science will flourish more in a democracy using the widespread
decision-making participation he proposes.
Although I share the concerns just mentioned, I applaud Kitcher for
calling attention to an important and escalating problem and examining it
rationally. His prescriptions may
seem utopian, but it is often necessary to strive for an otherworldly utopia in
order to achieve a worldly harmony.